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Notes
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE
STATE ADOPTION OF INDEPENDENT
REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS
RYAN P. BATES
INTRODUCTION
The continuing antics of redistricting and re-redistricting
following the 2000 census and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Vieth v. Jubelirer1 have again pushed the issue of gerrymandering of
legislative and congressional districts into the public consciousness.
2
Unlike the upheaval that followed the 1990 census, however, neither
prominority nor promajority racial gerrymanders reemerged as the
defining issue of the post-2000 redistricting cycle. Instead, the
polarizing debate this time around has centered on the issue of the
partisan gerrymander: the manipulation of a state redistricting
process by a party or political faction to ensure that it will capture
more than its “fair” share of the resulting districts in subsequent
elections. The most egregious example of the decade thus far
occurred in Texas.
It was not until 2003 that the Texas legislature finally got serious
about congressional redistricting. Although legislators had attempted
to draw districts during the 2001 session, partisan deadlock prevented
the adoption of a congressional redistricting plan, requiring a three-

Copyright © 2005 by Ryan P. Bates.
1. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
2. The issue of prominority racial gerrymandering reached the Supreme Court numerous
times as a result of the 1990 redistricting cycle. E.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001);
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). For a more comprehensive listing of the
litigation inspired by the 1990 redistricting cycle, see National Conference of State Legislatures,
Outline of Redistricting Litigation: The 1990s, http://www.senate.mn/departments/scr/redist/
redout.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2005) [hereinafter NCSL, 1990s Redistricting Litigation].
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judge federal district court to draw the plan used in the 2002
3
congressional elections. Under this plan, which “applied neutral
districting factors,” Texas elected seventeen Democratic and fifteen
4
Republican congressional representatives. But following the
Republican sweep of both houses of the Texas legislature and all
major state executive offices,5 pressure from U.S. Representative
Tom DeLay and other national Republican leaders to solidify the
GOP margin in the U.S. House of Representatives propelled the
Texas Republican leadership to revisit redistricting.6 A first attempt
was stymied when the Texas House Democrats fled the state to deny
7
the legislature a quorum until the regular session expired, forcing
Governor Rick Perry to call special legislative sessions to pass the
plan. In the first special session, Democrats invoked an informal
Senate supermajority requirement to prevent adoption of a plan;8 in
the second, the Senate Democrats fled the state, depriving the Senate
9
the necessary two-thirds quorum. After a forty-five-day standoff, a
Democratic state senator broke ranks and returned to Texas,10
allowing Governor Perry to call a third special session. Only after the
presiding officer changed the chamber’s cloture rule could the Senate
pass redistricting legislation on a virtually party-line vote, with a lone
West Texas Republican joining the Democrats in opposition.11

3. See generally Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01-CV-158, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25740 (E.D.
Tex. Nov. 14, 2001) (ordering adoption of a court-drawn redistricting plan following the state
legislature’s failure to adopt one), aff’d mem., 536 U.S. 919 (2002).
4. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458 (E.D. Tex. 2004), vacated sub nom. Jackson v.
Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004).
5. Id.
6. Juliet Eilperin, GOP’s New Push on Redistricting, WASH. POST, May 7, 2003, at A4;
Editorial, Don’t Redraw Texas’ Congressional Districts, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, May 7,
2003, at 6B.
7. Christy Hoppe & George Kuempel, Democrats Back, a Victory in Hand, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, May 17, 2003, at 1A. The flight prompted a national manhunt, involving
federal resources at DeLay’s insistence. R.G. Ratcliffe & Karen Masterson, DeLay Admits to
Role in Hunting for Democrats, HOUSTON CHRON., May 23, 2003, at 1A.
8. R.G. Ratcliffe, Death Knell Tolls for Redistricting—For Time Being, HOUSTON
CHRON., July 26, 2003, at 1A.
9. Edmund Walsh, Texas Legislature Adjourns Special Session, WASH. POST, Aug. 27,
2003, at A4.
10. Robert T. Garrett, Democrat’s Return Could End Standoff, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Sept. 3, 2003, at 1A.
11. R.G. Ratcliffe & Janet Elliott, Senate OKs Redistrict Plan as GOP Feuds, HOUSTON
CHRON., Sept. 24, 2003, at 1A.
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The plan that Governor Perry signed into law sought to shift the
partisan makeup of the Texas congressional delegation from
seventeen to fifteen in favor of Democrats to twenty-one to eleven in
favor of Republicans, mostly by taking deliberate aim at white
13
Democratic incumbents. The legislative counsel to Republican
Representative Joe Barton described it as “the most aggressive map I
have ever seen. . . . This has a real national impact that should assure
that Republicans keep the House no matter the national mood.”14
The Nineteenth District, formerly drawn around Lubbock, now
15
slithers eastward some three hundred miles. Metropolitan Austin,
formerly a single district, was drawn and quartered—portions now
belong to one district that reaches one hundred and fifty miles east to
Houston and to two others that stretch more than three hundred
miles south to the Mexican border,16 a configuration that has invited
comparisons of South Texas with “a pinstripe suit.”17 But the
distortions of the map were not simply geographic—for example,
Representative Martin Frost, a Dallas Democrat reelected in 2002
with 65 percent of the vote,18 was thrust into a new district with a 63
19
percent Republican registration. Because Frost’s former district
“simply disappear[ed],” most of his former constituents were shifted

12. The legality of this plan is currently being litigated and will be reviewed by the
Supreme Court during the 2005 Term. See GI Forum of Tex. v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 829 (2005)
(noting probable jurisdiction); Jackson v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 827 (2005) (same); League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 827 (2005) (same); Travis County, Tex. v. Perry, 126
S. Ct. 829 (2005) (same). Given that the Court has already passed once on a post-Vieth
opportunity to review the Texas re-redistricting, see Jackson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004),
vacating Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004), such a review seems unlikely to
produce a result as unhelpful as Vieth and thus offers an opportunity for the Justices to bring
some needed clarity to the jurisprudence.
13. See Editorial, The Soviet Republic of Texas, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2003, at A22
(quoting Republican state Representative Phil King as stating that “[any Democrat] who is not
in a minority district would have a very competitive race” (alteration in original)).
14. Edward Walsh, GOP Study Feeds Furor over Texas Redistricting, WASH. POST, Oct. 12,
2003, at A9.
15. Compare
Plan
01151C—U.S.
Congressional
Districts,
108th
Congress,
http://gis1.tlc.state.tx.us/planc01151/default.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005), with Plan 01374C—
U.S. Congressional Districts, 109th Congress, http://gis1.tlc.state.tx.us/planc01374/default.htm
(last visited Dec. 21, 2005).
16. Plan 01374C—U.S. Congressional Districts, 109th Congress, supra note 15.
17. The Soviet Republic of Texas, supra note 13, at A22.
18. Associated Press, U.S. House, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, Nov. 7, 2002, at 20A.
19. The Soviet Republic of Texas, supra note 13, at A22.
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into two Republican-dominated districts and one preexisting
20
majority-minority Democratic district.
The plan was successful in its main aims: four of the five
Democratic incumbents targeted by the map were defeated, leaving
the Texas delegation with the sought-after twenty-one to eleven
21
Republican margin, and the map was successfully defended, at least
initially, against charges of racial gerrymandering and minority vote
dilution.22
The saga of the Texas re-redistricting, though perhaps an outlier
in its vituperative partisanship, its extraordinary drama, and its
national media attention, was certainly not the only gerrymander of
the 2000 redistricting cycle. But as a parable illustrating the many
harms engendered by partisan gerrymandering, it is without peer. The
political harms inflicted by the re-redistricting are plain: ruination of
the bipartisan tradition in the Texas legislature; inaccurate
representation of voters’ aggregate preferences at both the statewide
and national levels; months-long hijacking of the state legislative
agenda, preventing consideration of programs crucial to many
Texans; millions of dollars spent on three special legislative sessions;
and violence to traditional notions of proper redistricting, such as
district compactness and the decennial cycle itself. Arguably
constitutional harms are also apparent, if one takes the trouble to
look for them: the “expressive harm”23 of governmental classification
according to one’s party affiliation or voting record; the dilution of a
political bloc vote, which fortuitously provided cover for what was in
reality a significant dilution of aggregate racial-minority voting

20. See Walsh, supra note 14, at A9 (quoting analysis by the legislative counsel to U.S.
Representative Joe Barton concerning the redistricting plan’s effect on Representative Frost’s
district).
21. Robert T. Garrett, One Democrat Survives Redistricting, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 4, 2004, at 23A. The six-seat gain in Texas was instrumental in the overall Republican
addition of five seats to their majority in the U.S. House of Representatives. See Charles
Babington & Juliet Eilperin, GOP Hopes to Expand Its Majority, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2004, at
A17.
22. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 481, 486, 496, 513 (E.D. Tex. 2004), vacated sub
nom Jackson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004).
23. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
483, 506–07 (1993) (defining expressive harms as those “result[ing] from the ideas or attitudes
expressed through a governmental action”).
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24
strength; and the chilling of the intradistrict political competition
necessary to responsive and accountable representation.
But as critical as what can be found is what cannot be: violations
of the equal protection standards for evaluating partisan
25
gerrymanders announced in Davis v. Bandemer. Although there was
plainly “intentional discrimination against an identifiable political
26
group,” one looks in vain for “evidence of continued frustration of
the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of
27
voters of a fair chance to influence the political process.” However
unwarranted in procedure or in outcome, it is almost certainly
impossible to prove that the Texas re-redistricting “will consistently
degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political
process as a whole.”28 Yet if this ne plus ultra of partisan
gerrymanders does not violate the standards announced in Bandemer,
it is difficult to imagine that any real-world instance of
gerrymandering ever would. Because such a showing is too
burdensome for any litigant to make, Bandemer has become, for all
intents and purposes, a nullity, a quaint historical oddity of no
prescriptive force.
The difficulty, as courts have consistently found in the years since
Bandemer, is in defining an operative standard to measure “fairness”
in this context: “The key problem is that there is ultimately no real
conception [within the judiciary] of what a properly functioning
electoral system looks like and, not surprisingly, no real conception of
29
what is the precise harm to be remedied.” Responding to lower
courts’ inability to solve this dilemma, the Vieth v. Jubelirer plurality

24. The view that Plan 01374C was retrogressive in terms of minority voting strength was
unanimously shared by the staff attorneys in the Civil Rights Divison of the Department of
Justice charged with preclearance of the Texas redistricting plan under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. Dan Eggen, Justice Staff Saw Texas Districting as Illegal, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2005,
at A1.
25. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). Following the failure of existing ex ante procedural controls such
as decennial redistricting and the one-person, one-vote principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 568 (1964), to address partisan gerrymandering successfully, Bandemer announced that, in
principle, courts would evaluate claims of partisan gerrymandering against a substantive
standard of fairness rooted in ex post evaluations of the fairness of electoral outcomes relative
to the political preferences of the relevant population, 478 U.S. at 132–33 (plurality opinion).
26. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127 (plurality opinion).
27. Id. at 133.
28. Id. at 132.
29. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 611
(2002).
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advocated overturning Bandemer and returning the issue to the
30
Though Justice Kennedy’s dispositive
political branches.
concurrence refused to return to the view that partisan gerrymanders
are nonjusticiable political questions, it nonetheless rejected every
plausible yardstick for measuring allegations of constitutional harm.31
Already doubtful under Bandemer, judicial relief for those injured by
32
unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders thus seems increasingly
unlikely after Vieth.
This Note argues that, following Justice Scalia’s invitation in
Vieth for the political branches to address the problems of political
33
gerrymandering, Congress would be both authorized and justified in
requiring the states to adopt independent and nonpartisan
commissions as the primary mechanism for performing the (normally)
decennial redistricting process, both for congressional and state
legislative districts. Whether or not the Supreme Court continues to
evade its responsibility to protect political minorities from structural
oppression through redistricting, Congress retains both remedial and
prophylactic authority to address the constitutional harm that
Bandemer recognized in partisan gerrymanders.
As this Note and other scholarship suggest, independent
redistricting commissions are an enticing policy option for addressing
this harm. These commissions can temper excessive partisanship and
self-dealing by distancing legislators from the redistricting process,
without completely eliding the important political nature of the
process. Certainly, independent redistricting commissions are not
guaranteed to achieve the elusive—likely impossible—ideal of

30. 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
31. See id. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (dismissing the case for failure to state a valid
claim because there was no standard with which to measure the alleged burden on plaintiffs’
rights).
32. Vieth’s reconsideration of whether partisan gerrymanders fall under the political
question doctrine is rooted in the lack of a judicially manageable standard for evaluating these
claims, not in the absence of a constitutional injury. Despite the abstract debate over the
justiciability of the issue, there is little question that, at least as a theoretical matter, sufficiently
egregious partisan gerrymandering can give rise to constitutional claims. See id. at 292 (plurality
opinion) (stating that “[w]e do not disagree with [the] judgment” that “severe partisan
gerrymanders [are incompatible] with democratic principles”); id. at 311–12 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“Allegations of unconstitutional bias in apportionment are most serious
claims . . . .”).
33. See id. at 275–76, 277 n.4 (“[T]he Framers provided a remedy for [gerrymandered
districts] in the Constitution. . . . The power bestowed on Congress to regulate elections, and in
particular to restrain the practice of political gerrymandering, has not lain dormant.”).
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balancing competitiveness, responsiveness, proportionality, interestgroup representation, preservation of political subdivisions,
contiguity, compactness, and the many other desired characteristics
when drawing district lines. Yet they may represent the best solution
available under the current legal framework.
In framing this argument, this Note first surveys federal courts’
interventions against partisan gerrymanders and their concomitant
failure to develop either a concept of the constitutional harm or a
manageable standard of review, suggesting the need for legislative
relief in the face of judicial inaction. The existing models of
redistricting commissions, as implemented by several states, are then
considered, along with their efficacy in relieving the evils of
redistricting by self-interested legislators. Finally, this Note proposes
that congressional action requiring all states to adopt a proven model
for such redistricting commissions is not only warranted, but is
constitutionally permissible, both as to congressional and state
legislative districts.
I. INTO THE POLITICAL THICKET—JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO
GERRYMANDERING
Prior to 1962, challenges to the malapportionment of
congressional and state legislative districts were held nonjusticiable
by federal courts, a position typically justified by invocations of the
political question doctrine, concerns over administrable remedies and
courts’ competence to implement them, and observations that the
political branches of government, notably Congress, provided more
appropriate forums in which to seek relief.34 Baker v. Carr35
established for the first time that malapportionment denying equal
protection—what one scholar has described as “the right of the
individual citizen to approach the ballot box on an equal footing with
each other citizen”36—presented a justiciable constitutional claim.37
This decision sparked a revolution in reapportionment across the

34. E.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552–56 (1946).
35. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
36. Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political
Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1648 (1993).
37. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
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38
39
nation, but it was not until Reynolds v. Sims, two years later, that
the Court settled on a substantive standard under the Equal
Protection Clause by which to evaluate apportionment: one person,
40
one vote. As the bedrock principle for “achieving . . . fair and
effective representation for all citizens,”41 one-person, one-vote
provided an objective, readily manageable standard by which claims
could be measured. It was initially thought that such a powerful and
wide-ranging principle could counteract all forms of district
manipulation—including partisan gerrymandering42—in which
“neither history . . . nor economic or other sorts of group interests,
are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from
population-based representation.”43
Within two decades, the optimistic belief that one-person, onevote would successfully deter partisan gerrymanders had been
definitively refuted. Despite the increasingly rigid requirement of
equipopulous congressional districts,44 creative cartography and
sophisticated analytical tools allowed legislatures to continue their
manipulation of census data to craft districts of bizarre shapes, thus
skewing electoral outcomes but nonetheless not running afoul of the
Court’s equal protection criteria. The nadir came in New Jersey: in
Karcher v. Daggett,45 the Court sidestepped an opportunity to address
a blatant gerrymander directly,46 instead invalidating the redistricting

38. See Issacharoff, supra note 36, at 1647–48, 1648 n.25 (“[In Baker and Reynolds, t]he
Court cast aside the established means of political business in virtually every state in the
country . . . .”).
39. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
40. See id. at 568 (“[A]n individual’s right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally
impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens
living [i]n other parts of the State.”); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964)
(requiring one-person, one-vote for congressional districts on a parallel theory rooted in Article
I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution).
41. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565–66.
42. See id. at 578–79 (“Indiscriminate districting . . . may be little more than an open
invitation to partisan gerrymandering.”).
43. Id. at 579–80.
44. See Kirkpatrick v. Preiser, 394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969) (requiring that congressional
apportionments reflect “a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality” and
rejecting de minimis variations as detracting from the goals of equal protection). A more
generous standard was applied to state legislative districts, presuming the constitutionality of
districting plans with maximum deviations from population equality no greater than ten percent.
Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983).
45. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
46. Id. at 764–65 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE
LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 181 (rev. 2d ed. 2002)
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plan on the basis of a maximum deviation from equality that was less
47
than the margin of error for the census data itself. One-person, onevote had, essentially by virtue of its administrability alone,48 ceased to
be the means and become the end itself. Rather than serving as one
measure of conformance with the constitutional commands of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it served to further insulate sophisticated
49
gerrymanders from equal protection challenges.
By recognizing an equal protection claim against partisan
gerrymandering independent of equipopulation deviations, Davis v.
50
Bandemer sought to correct this failing. However, although a
majority determined that such claims were justiciable,51 only a fourJustice plurality agreed upon a substantive standard for adjudicating
them: “intentional discrimination against an identifiable political
group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.”52 Though
53
intent could be easily proven in the redistricting context, the
plurality set forth a discriminatory-effect test substantially more
difficult to satisfy:
[U]nconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral
system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a
voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a
whole.
. . . [A]n equal protection violation may be found only where
the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in
their opportunity to influence the political process effectively. . . .
[S]uch a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by
evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the

(“The clear import of Karcher was a confrontation with a Democratic Party gerrymander that
resulted in what was aptly termed ‘a flight of cartographic fancy.’”).
47. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 735 (plurality opinion).
48. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 121 (1980) (suggesting that oneperson, one-vote’s “administrability is its long suit, and the more troublesome question is what
else it has to recommend it”).
49. See Issacharoff, supra note 36, at 1654–55 (“The legacy of Reynolds became, in effect, a
shield against substantive challenges to partisan manipulations so long as the ensuing districting
schemes satisfied the narrow commands of one-person, one-vote.”).
50. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
51. Id. at 125.
52. Id. at 127 (plurality opinion).
53. Id. at 129.
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voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to
54
influence the political process.

However, only two Justices, evaluating the substantive claim under a
55
different standard, voted to uphold the finding of an equal
protection violation.56
The disposition in Bandemer set the pattern for the next eighteen
57
years. During that time, only a single case, Republican Party of
North Carolina v. Martin, was found to violate the Bandemer
58
plurality’s standard, no administrable substantive standard emerged
from lower-court consideration of partisan gerrymandering claims,59
and virtually all such claims were dismissed, including many
60
fundamentally factually indistinguishable from Martin. So it was that
61
the Court’s decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer was eagerly anticipated as
an opportunity to correct the failings of Bandemer, one way or
62
another.
As with much in life, anticipation was surely better than reality.
Rather than offering some degree of doctrinal clarity, whether a
definitive finding of nonjusticiability or a reformulated substantive
standard for adjudicating claims, Vieth achieved an incoherence that
made Bandemer seem comparatively clear. Bringing the discussion of
judicial cognizance of the constitutional harm full-circle, the plurality
concluded that partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable,

54. Id. at 132–33.
55. Id. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (advocating a multifactor balancing test). Justice Stevens joined Powell’s opinion.
56. Id. at 184.
57. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Bandemer has
served almost exclusively as an invitation to litigation without much prospect of redress.”
(quoting SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 886 (rev. 2d ed. 2002))).
58. See 980 F.2d 943, 958 (4th Cir. 1992) (challenging the method by which North Carolina
elected superior court judges).
59. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 280 (plurality opinion) (“To think that this lower-court
jurisprudence has brought forth ‘judicially discernible and manageable standards’ would be
fantasy.”).
60. See id. at 279–80, 280 n.6 (citing numerous cases in which “districting plans . . . were
upheld despite allegations of extreme partisan discrimination, bizarrely shaped districts, and
disproportionate results”).
61. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
62. See Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan
Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626, 626 (2004) (observing the
improbability that the Court would accept the case merely to reaffirm Bandemer and noting the
expectation that Vieth would either overrule Bandemer or replace its substantive standard).
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relying upon invocations of the political question doctrine, concerns
over administrable remedies and courts’ competence to implement
them, and observations that the political branches of government,
notably Congress, provided more appropriate forums in which to seek
63
relief. But with five Justices voting to retain Bandemer, the hopes of
Tom DeLay, constitutional originalists, and yet another generation of
law students struggling to understand “the law of democracy” were
dashed:64 constitutional challenges to redistricting plans remain
justiciable.65 The troubling part, however, is that whereas such
challenges were previously understood as equal protection claims
66
grounded in intentional discrimination and discriminatory effect, it is
no longer clear upon which constitutional grounds these challenges
must now rest.
The Vieth dissenters, seeking to preserve the justiciability of
partisan gerrymandering claims while refining the Bandemer
conception of the equal protection harm, offered a broad array of
67
potential replacements. Justice Kennedy, writing the dispositive
concurrence, rejected all of these proposals, as well as the standard
utilized since Bandemer for measuring the constitutional harm, as
“either unmanageable or inconsistent with precedent, or both.”68 On

63. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277–81 (plurality opinion); see also supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
64. Cf. Hasen, supra note 62, at 627. See generally ISSACHAROFF, supra note 46.
65. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 317 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
66. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986) (plurality opinion).
67. Justice Stevens suggested that governmental discrimination in redistricting that
burdened First Amendment associational rights could be analyzed under the discernible and
manageable standards offered by political patronage cases. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 323–25 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also advanced the idea that partisan gerrymanders propagate a
“representational harm” in the same manner as do racial gerrymanders, id. at 330, an interesting
position given his vociferous opposition to such a conception of the harm in Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, 678 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Souter and Ginsburg, opting for a vote
dilution model, propounded a five-step test for a potential plaintiff to make out a prima facie
case, which the state could then rebut. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 346–51 (Souter, J., dissenting). One of
the threshold showings would be a correlation between the challenged district’s deviations from
traditional districting principles and the population distribution of the group allegedly
discriminated against, id. at 349, something like a poor man’s version of the ecological
regression analysis used to demonstrate racial bloc voting and its effect on districting choices in
the racial gerrymandering cases. Justice Breyer similarly conceived the harm as vote dilution
leading to unjustified entrenchment: “a situation in which a party that enjoys only minority
support among the populace has nonetheless contrived to take, and hold, legislative power.” Id.
at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
68. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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the other hand, he refused to “bar all future claims of injury from a
69
partisan gerrymander.” Instead, Justice Kennedy speculated that
administrable standards might emerge from voters’ First Amendment
rights against being penalized for their expression of political views or
their association with a political party.70 Yet this line of inquiry led
nowhere, given that finding that a partisan gerrymander burdens a
plaintiff’s representational rights in violation of the First Amendment
would “depend[] first on courts’ having available a manageable
standard by which to measure the effect of the apportionment.”71 This
stopping point is identical in terms of the political question doctrine
to that reached under an equal protection analysis—once one rejects
vote dilution, improper motive, expressive harms, and conflicts of
interest as mechanisms for measuring a First Amendment claim, as
Justice Kennedy has, one has reached yet another doctrinal dead
end.72
Although Vieth may be readily interpreted as a signal that
federal courts are unavailable to those seeking redress against
partisan gerrymanders,73 the Court has since muddied the picture
even further. After a three-judge district court declared that the
Texas re-redistricting was not a partisan gerrymander under
Bandemer’s high standard of proof,74 the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Vieth.75 Perhaps the
course of the Texas re-redistricting was sufficiently egregious to
garner five votes for some form of ex ante review of redistricting

69. Id. at 309.
70. Id. at 314.
71. Id. at 315.
72. See Hasen, supra note 62, at 634 (“[T]here likely is no partisan gerrymandering
standard that can simultaneously meet all of Justice Kennedy’s requirements; what remains is a
null set.”); id. at 637 (“In short, there is nothing left as a test for partisan gerrymandering under
Justice Kennedy’s three requirements. We are at a dead end.”). Perhaps this outcome was
intended—that, until a broader social consensus emerges as to the nature and degree of harm
posed by partisan gerrymanders, the Court will not settle upon a conception of the
constitutional harm and standards for recognizing and remedying it. In the meantime, however,
doctrinal foundations recede ever further into the murk.
73. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion) (inviting lower courts to treat Justice
Kennedy’s opinion “as a reluctant fifth vote against justiciability”).
74. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 474 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
75. Jackson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004), remanded to Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d
756 (E.D. Tex. 2005). Reading the tea leaves of a vacation-and-remand order is a risky business.
All that can definitively be said is that the Court found Vieth to be “sufficiently analogous and,
perhaps, decisive to compel reexamination of [Session].” Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S.
776, 777 (1964).
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plans based on the redistricting procedures themselves, leaving aside
the tougher questions of reviewing the fairness of electoral
76
outcomes. The question whether procedural irregularities in the
Texas re-redistricting could be sufficient in themselves to justify
overturning a legislatively adopted plan might explain the Supreme
Court’s decision to hear appeals in four cases challenging Texas’
77
current districts. Though such an interpretation is consistent with
some of the questions presented in those cases, however, the number
and variety of questions presented makes it difficult to draw
inferences about where the Justices’ interests in these cases lie.78 In
any case, these challenges provide another chance for the Justices to
consider standards of procedural or substantive fairness by which to
adjudicate partisan gerrymanders, and it is hoped that they will seize
the opportunity. Until they do so, whether in Jackson and its
companion cases or in response to some future partisan gerrymander,
it is clear that Justice Scalia’s question criticizing Vieth’s disposition—

76. The puzzling Session remand came on October 18, 2004, two weeks before the map at
issue was used in Texas congressional elections, Jackson, 534 U.S. at 941; thus, any disposition
other than dismissal for failure to state a claim or nonjusticiability would imply a shift from the
outcome-reviewing standards accepted under Bandemer and discussed in Vieth.
77. See GI Forum of Tex. v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 829 (2005) (noting probable jurisdiction);
Jackson v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 827 (2005) (same); League of United Latin American Citizens
(LULAC) v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 827 (2005) (same); Travis County, Tex. v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 827
(2005) (same).
78. The ten questions presented by the four cases range from issues of procedural and
substantive fairness in defining unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders under Bandemer and
Vieth to the requirements for modifying majority-minority districts under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act and relevant Supreme Court precedents on racial gerrymandering. Most
relevant to the concerns discussed here are questions raised in Travis County, Jackson, and
LULAC concerning partisan motivation and the validity of using decennial census data in
shaping a mid-decade redistricting plan. See Questions Presented in Jackson v. Perry (No. 05276), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00276qp.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2005) (“Whether
the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment prohibit States from redrawing lawful
districting plans in the middle of the decade, for the sole purpose of maximizing partisan
advantage.”); Questions Presented in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (No.
05-204), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00204qp.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2005)
(“Whether the 2003 . . . [redistricting plan], adopted and developed using outdated, inaccurate
2000 Census data . . . , in violation of one person, one vote when measured against 2003 Census
data, and when ‘the single-minded purpose . . . was to gain partisan advantage’ and when such
purpose is realized, is an unconstitutional political gerrymander.”); Questions Presented in
Travis County, Texas v. Perry (No. 05-254), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00254qp.pdf
(last visited Dec. 29, 2005) (“Does the Texas legislature’s 2003 replacement of a legally valid
congressional districting plan with a statewide plan, enacted for ‘the singleminded purpose’ of
gaining partisan advantage, satisfy the stringent constitutional rule of equipopulous districts by
relying on the 2000 decennial census and the fiction of inter-censal population accuracy?”).
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79
“What are the lower courts to make of this pronouncement?” —
remains unanswered.

II. THE POLITICAL THICKET REDUX—LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS
States, however, have not been quiescent in the absence of
judicial intervention against partisan gerrymanders. Their primary
response has been the expansion of the role of nonlegislative bodies
in the redistricting process, particularly independent redistricting
commissions.80 This Part first explores the varieties of commissions
that have been implemented and then gives particular attention to the
potential benefits of the tie-breaker commission model. Its relative
merits are considered, and the systemic issues which prevent wider
state adoption of redistricting commissions are then discussed.
A. The Common Forms of Independent Redistricting Commissions
Currently, slightly fewer than half of the states utilize some form
of independent commission in the process of redistricting
congressional or state legislative districts.81 Although there are wide
82
variations in these commissions’ forms, the most important variables
are the commissions’ responsibility for the redistricting process and
their membership structures.83

79. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305.
80. In the taxonomy of this Note, the term “independent redistricting commission” denotes
a body separate from the state legislature with some role in the state’s redistricting process.
Each of the variations on this general theme discussed infra, such as primary bipartisan
commissions or backup blue-ribbon commissions, is a subspecies of this genus.
81. As of this writing, twenty-three states have implemented some form of this institution.
See sources cited infra notes 84, 87, 89.
82. See Christopher C. Confer, Note, To Be About the People’s Business: An Examination
of the Utility of Nonpolitical/Bipartisan Legislative Redistricting Commissions, 13 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 115, 119–23 (2003) (describing the variability of structurally significant features of
state legislative redistricting commissions); Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting
Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837, 841–51 (1997) (same).
83. A third difference, less critical for the argument of this Note, is the scope of
commission authority. In the majority of states implementing any form of redistricting
commission, their function is limited to defining state legislative districts, leaving congressional
redistricting to the state legislatures. See ALASKA CONST. art. VI; ARK. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1–4;
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; MISS. CONST. art.
XIII, § 254; MO. CONST. art. III, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 11A;
ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 6; PA. CONST. art. II, § 17; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 5; TEX. CONST. art. III,
§ 28. Only a minority employ commissions to define both congressional and state legislative
districts. See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 2(1); CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(b); HAW. CONST. art. IV,
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The first key differentiator among the various forms is a
commission’s degree of responsibility in the redistricting process. The
states have thus far implemented three models: primary, backup, and
84
advisory. The primary commission, the most common form, has the
initial responsibility for drawing up district maps and is generally
tasked with beginning and completing the redistricting process within
85
a specified period following the availability of federal census data.
The many states implementing the primary commission model also
vary in the degree of legislative oversight imposed on the
commissions.86 In contrast to the primary commission model, the less§ 2; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3 (Maine legislative districting);
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2 (congressional redistricting); id. art. IV, § 3
(state legislative redistricting); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43; IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.3 (West
1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 21-A, § 1206(1) (West Supp. 2004) (Maine congressional
districting). No state commission is responsible for congressional, but not state legislative,
redistricting.
Removing state legislative districting from the hands of state legislators eliminates, at
least in theory, conflicts of interest in that branch of the redistricting process. However, their
retention of control over congressional redistricting permits self-interested political
maneuvering both by ambitious state legislators seeking to move up the political food chain and
by current members of Congress, as Representative DeLay’s involvement in the Texas reredistricting demonstrates. Although there is no guarantee that backroom political maneuvering
does not also affect independent redistricting commissions, the formal independence of such
bodies from legislatures, coupled in many cases with membership selection mechanisms
designed to foster political parity and defuse political incentives, provide structural impediments
to subversion of the commissions’ independence. Thus, unless specifically noted otherwise, this
Note’s argument is intended to span both congressional and state legislative redistricting.
84. Fifteen states use the primary commission model, though they vary in other important
respects. ALASKA CONST. art. VI; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. VIII,
§§ 1–4; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48; HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; ME.
CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; MO. CONST. art. III, § 2; MONT. CONST. art.
V, § 14; N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2 (congressional redistricting); id. art. IV, § 3 (state legislative
redistricting); OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1; PA. CONST. art. II, § 17; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43;
IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.3 (West 1999).
85. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. III, § 2 (requiring the first meeting of the redistricting
commission within fifteen days of the final member’s appointment, the filing of a tentative
redistricting plan within five months, and the filing of a final plan within six months); see also
National Conference of State Legislatures, Redistricting Law 2000, app. E (Redistricting
Commissions: Legislative Plans), http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/
red2000/apecomsn.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2005) [hereinafter NCSL, Redistricting
Commissions] (aggregating, with some omissions, information on redistricting commissions for
state legislative districts, including requirements of formation dates and initial and final
deadlines for plan submission).
86. Among those states implementing the primary commission model, there is some
variation on the degree of institutionalized oversight of the plans developed by the commission.
The plans of the vast majority of these states’ commissions become law with no judicial or
legislative approval. E.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VI; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1; ARK. CONST.
art. VIII; HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; MO.
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87
only takes responsibility for
common backup commission
redistricting following the failure of the state legislature to fulfill its
duty as the primary drafting body for a redistricting plan.88 Finally, in
89
the rare advisory model, the commission provides nonbinding advice
to the legislature during the redistricting process.90
The second fundamental attribute of these commissions, and the
one most determinative of the “nonpartisan” nature of the
91
commission’s work and results, is the mechanism by which their
92
membership is determined. Although there are minor variations

CONST. art. III, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2 (congressional
redistricting); id. art. IV, § 3 (state legislative redistricting); OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1; PA.
CONST. art. II, § 17. However, four states restrict the independence of their commissions by
either allowing or requiring intervention by the state judicial or legislative branches. Iowa
requires direct legislative approval of commission plans and allows the legislature to take over
the task of drafting the plan if three successive commission plans are rejected. IOWA CODE
ANN. § 42.3 (West 1999). Maine similarly requires legislative approval or amendment, by a twothirds vote, but grants the state Supreme Judicial Court authority to draft plans if the legislature
fails to meet the supermajority threshold. ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3. Washington does not
require legislative approval for commission plans to take effect, but the legislature may amend
such plans by a two-thirds vote. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(7). Finally, Colorado requires
commission plans to be approved by the state supreme court, rather than by its legislature.
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48(1)(e). Such forms of oversight, by providing opportunities for
political actors to intervene in the otherwise independent process, represent a value judgment
that the input of elected officials responsible to their constituents remains an important check
upon the redistricting commission.
87. Seven states use the backup commission model. CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(b); ILL.
CONST. art. IV, § 3(b); MISS. CONST. art. XIII, § 254; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 11A; ORE. CONST.
art. IV, § 6 (vesting authority in the state supreme court); S.D. CONST. art. III, § 5 (same); TEX.
CONST. art. III, § 28.
88. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 11A (providing that a commission shall reapportion
state legislative districts if the legislature “fail[s] or refuse[s] to make such apportionment within
the time provided”); see also NCSL, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 85 (detailing, with
omissions, requirements of formation dates and final deadlines for backup commissions).
89. Vermont uses this model exclusively. VT. CONST. ch. II, § 73. Connecticut also utilizes
an advisory commission, distinct from its backup commission. CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(a).
90. Because the recommendations of advisory commissions require legislative
implementation, such commissions are fundamentally dependent on state legislatures in a
manner distinct from the other two models. As they therefore provide no opportunity for
reduction of partisan political influence in the redistricting process, they will not be considered
further here.
91. It is neither reasonably expected nor necessarily desirable that all partisan competition
be removed from the redistricting process by a procedural or institution-selecting control on the
process. The aim is instead to keep partisanship within an acceptable range, a purely normative
goal. See infra text accompanying notes 109–10.
92. A secondary consideration in the membership selection mechanism is whether service
on a redistricting commission should prevent members from seeking public office for a future
period, either in the body for which redistricting was performed or for any major office in the
state. Both measures have the effect of discouraging and preventing conflicts of interest and
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among the states, three models have dominated: bipartisan, blueribbon, and tie-breaker panels. In addition, the Iowa model presents a
unique approach to determining commission membership.
Numerically, and perhaps functionally, the most inferior option is
the bipartisan panel, in which equal numbers of commission members
are affiliated with one of the two major political parties.93 Although
the potential for deadlock on such panels is obvious,94 bipartisanship
can also serve as an impetus to craft a plan favorable to both parties’
interests in stability and retention of incumbent representatives, when
the alternative is a plan drawn in a judicial proceeding which might
serve other popular interests. This outcome, of course, is not
especially congruent with the vision of the independent redistricting
commission as an antigerrymandering device; a bipartisan
gerrymander is a plausible and undesirable outcome of such panels.95

self-dealing in the redistricting process. Four states enforce versions of both restrictions.
ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8(a), (c); ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3), (13); IDAHO CONST. art.
III, § 2(2), (6); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6. Three states only disqualify commission members
from some offices for a future period. HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; MO. CONST. art. III, § 2; N.J.
CONST. art. II, § 2(1)(a) (congressional redistricting commission only). Three states restrict
current or recent officeholders from commission membership. MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(2);
PA. CONST. art. II, § 17(b) (commission chair only); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(3). Naturally,
only states with bipartisan or tie-breaker membership models have adopted either restriction.
93. Four states implement a pure bipartisan model. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; MICH.
CONST. art. IV, § 6; MO. CONST. art. III, § 2; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43.
94. See Kubin, supra note 82, at 847 & n.51 (noting that, through the 1990 round of
redistricting, Michigan’s bipartisan commission had consistently failed to adopt a redistricting
plan).
95. For example, in the 1970 redistricting cycle, the Connecticut redistricting commission
generated a bipartisan gerrymander that was eventually challenged in the Supreme Court.
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (upholding the Connecticut gerrymander and
observing that “judicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports fairly to
allocate political power to the parties in accordance with their voting strength and, within quite
tolerable limits, succeeds in doing so”). Professor Samuel Issacharoff, among others, has
roundly criticized Gaffney’s acceptance of bipartisan gerrymandering as limiting the conception
of constitutional harm to “some notion of unfair conduct directed at one or the other of the
major parties” rather than protecting voter welfare by ensuring competitiveness within a vibrant
“political market.” Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 612–17. But see Nathaniel Persily, Reply, In
Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to IncumbentProtecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 676 (2002) (“Gaffney does not demonstrate
the problem of self-interested political manipulation or the need for aggressive judicial relief. If
anything, [it] serves as a warning to those who would presume that judges are inherently
different from politicians in the motivations underlying their redistricting decisions or that
‘nonpartisan’ redistricting necessarily fosters competition.”).
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96

More popular, but less auspicious for reducing partisanship in
the redistricting process, is the blue-ribbon panel; the numerous
variations on this model employ high-ranking state officers as
members of the redistricting commission without regard to any
balance of partisan affiliation. The obvious risk of this model is its
potential for concentrating, rather than diluting, the partisanship of
the redistricting process, because there is no guarantee of
representation for opposing viewpoints. In Texas, for instance,
membership on the backup commission is conferred directly on
97
specific state offices. During the 2003 re-redistricting, had the
commission become involved, its entirely Republican membership98
would have been unlikely to come to a result significantly different
from that of the state legislature. The potential for such one-sidedness
in commission membership, particularly involving actors who are
simultaneously engaged in the state political process, raises
fundamental questions about the fairness of this model. The blueribbon variant employed in Oregon, in which the secretary of state is
the sole commission member,99 even further undermines diversity of
viewpoints and enhances the potential for partisanship to
predominate.
The theoretically most sound, and numerically most common, of
100
the membership models is the tie-breaker commission. Under this
model, an even number of membership slots are equally divided
between the two major parties, often with members chosen by the
majority and minority leaders of the state legislature, and an
ostensibly neutral tie-breaking member is chosen, typically by
majority vote of the commission membership.101 This design promotes

96. This model is employed by eight states. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 4; ARK. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. XIII, § 254; OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 11A;
ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 6; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 5; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28.
97. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28 (naming the lieutenant governor, the speaker of the
House, the attorney general, the state comptroller, and the land commissioner to the backup
redistricting commission).
98. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
99. ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
100. Nine states use tie-breaker commissions. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3);
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48; CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(b); HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; ILL.
CONST. art. IV, § 3; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; N.J. CONST.
art. II, § 2 (congressional redistricting); id. art. IV, § 3 (state legislative redistricting); PA.
CONST. art. II, § 17.
101. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (providing that the president of the state senate, the
speaker of the state house, and designees of the minority leadership of each chamber shall each
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bipartisan cooperation and discourages stonewalling. Though
incentives for bipartisan gerrymandering are not eliminated, they are
weaker than in the pure bipartisan model: where the deciding vote is
cast by an ostensibly neutral participant, each side is likely to court
that vote by proposing a plan that ensures competition. The political
cost of doing so is likely lower, all other things equal, than the cost of
creating a competition-free bipartisan gerrymander that attracts one
or more votes from the partisan opposition.102 Despite academic
grumblings over the difficulties inherent in finding a Platonic
103
philosopher-king to undertake the chairmanship, the tie-breaker
commission, through structural checks and balances, presents the best
opportunity to reduce the degree of partisanship while preserving the
benefits of reasonable competition.
Finally, Iowa’s redistricting commission employs a unique
structure, in that a semi-independent state agency, the Legislative
Services Agency (LSA), performs the redistricting, subject to
104
legislative approval. The LSA is purportedly nonpartisan, but as
critics of the system have noted, LSA employees serve at the pleasure
105
of a body controlled by the legislative majority. On the other hand,
supporters note that plans produced by the LSA have nonetheless
kept congressional districts competitive, even as competition in
districts nationwide has been anemic at best.106

select two members, and that the eight so selected shall select a ninth as chairperson by a sixvote majority).
102. The major unspoken premise here, of course, is that the marginal benefits of the
bipartisan gerrymander are outweighed by the marginal costs of producing a plan that attracts
an opponent’s vote, rather than that of the neutral chair.
103. See Persily, supra note 95, at 678 (arguing that, even if a philosopher-king could be
found to develop and apply neutral redistricting principles, redistricting by self-interested
representatives yields philosophically preferable results); Kubin, supra note 82, at 848–49, 849
n.67 (arguing that politically neutral districting is preferable despite the inability to ensure
perfect neutrality).
104. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 2A.1 (West 1999) (“A legislative services agency is created as a
nonpartisan, central legislative staff agency under the direction and control of the legislative
council. The agency shall cooperate with and serve all members of the general assembly, the
legislative council, and committees of the general assembly.”).
105. Persily, supra note 95, at 675.
106. See Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 624–26 (contrasting the vitality of competition in Iowa
House races with what were anticipated to be uncompetitive races in Massachusetts, California,
Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Texas, New Jersey, and New York). But see Persily, supra note 95, at
675 (attributing district competitiveness to Iowa’s political culture rather than to features of the
institutional form of its redistricting process).
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B. The Perceived Benefits of Independent Redistricting Commissions
Selection of the institutional form for a redistricting commission
has concrete consequences for both the process and outcome of
redistricting. When properly designed, such commissions can
moderate excessive partisanship without completely excising the
political character of the process. Tie-breaker commissions
accomplish this by including equal numbers of political members but
placing the deciding vote in the hands of a nonaligned tie-breaking
member. They thus provide an antimajoritarian brake on partisan
gerrymandering,107
while
equally
discouraging
minority
obstructionism, by threatening each side with the loss of the tiebreaking vote.
Moreover, a holdout dynamic is unlikely to emerge in tie-breaker
commissions. Because losing the tie-breaking vote means that the
opponent’s proposal succeeds, the cost of holding out is very high.
Both parties are thus discouraged from refusing to compromise in the
hopes of moving the redistricting fight to a judicial forum—a practice
that is common in legislatures and in purely bipartisan commissions.
Instead, the institutional promotion of moderation and compromise
effected by the tie-breaker form, along with the reduced self-dealing
produced by removing legislators from the process, allows other
108
important values to come to the fore.
It is worth reiterating that elimination of all political
considerations from the redistricting process is neither an expected
nor desired result of the adoption of a commission model, despite
critics’ suggestions to the contrary.109 The common description of such
commissions as “nonpartisan” is admittedly incorrect; it is merely a
useful linguistic handle to distinguish them from purely “bipartisan”
commissions that tend to result in “bipartisan” cooperative

107. Note that, because the relevant majority here is legislative, rather than popular,
“antimajoritarian” is not necessarily equivalent to “antidemocratic.” Because of the “winner’s
bonus” allocated by the first-past-the-post, districted election system prevalent in our country, it
is likely that the majority party is legislatively overrepresented relative to the general
population. See Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751,
765–67 (2004) (defining partisan fairness in redistricting in terms of the symmetry of the
winner’s bonus).
108. In many instances, these are constitutionally or statutorily mandated redistricting
criteria that might otherwise be slighted by partisan or self-serving ardor. See, e.g., ARIZ.
CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14) (setting out a hierarchy of redistricting goals).
109. See Persily, supra note 95, at 673–79 (suggesting that such commissions are merely selfdefeating attempts to “get[] the politics out of politics”).
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gerrymandering or “bipartisan” deadlock. However, the search for
institutional controls that further the public interest in representative
governance by inducing partisan actors to compromise and moderate
their political aims should not be dismissed out of hand because of
nomenclature. The ideal, and a more accurate though less euphonic
label, is simply “less-partisan.” A truly nonpartisan system, perhaps
following Professor John Hart Ely’s pungent suggestion to merely
“[g]rid the [d]amn [t]hing,”110 might well result in startling
inequities.111 Many of our governmental institutions instead rely on
the adversarial process, tempered by institutional checks and
balances, to work in the public interest; removing redistricting from
the hands of self-interested legislators would more accurately align
the process with this tradition.
In addition to reducing political bias in redistricting outcomes,
independent redistricting commissions may have significant corollary
benefits. For instance, redistricting plans drawn by nonpartisan
commissions may increase the competitiveness of individual districts,
112
as in Iowa. Theoretically, increased district competitiveness brings a
corresponding increase in the responsiveness of district
representation113 and may also marginally reduce voter apathy by
removing one basis for the perception that individual electoral
participation is irrelevant because electoral outcomes are a foregone
conclusion.114 Further, removing redistricting from the already-full
plates of state legislatures will increase the amount of legislative time
available to devote to other important issues. Finally, redistricting

110. John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L. REV. 607,
635 & n.124 (1998).
111. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (decrying “politically mindless
approach[es]” as likely to produce “the most grossly gerrymandered results”).
112. See Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 623–26 (contrasting the general state of incumbent
entrenchment, with 98.5% incumbency retention in the 2000 congressional elections, with
Iowa’s four “highly competitive” House races in 2002).
113. See id. at 627–28 (explaining that noncompetitiveness prevents electoral outcomes from
reflecting actual voter preferences).
114. It was argued in 1997, even before the Clinton impeachment, Bush v. Gore, and other
depressing notables of recent political history, that independent redistricting commissions were
justifiable because representative government has so little public confidence that virtually any
reform offering the hope of improved public perceptions would be a welcome change. See
Kubin, supra note 82, at 859–60, 860 n.120.
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commissions may even realize tangible monetary savings by reducing
115
administrative overhead relative to full legislative consideration.
C. “Success” among Independent Redistricting Commissions
The debate over whether existing independent redistricting
commissions represent an improvement over redistricting by state
legislatures continues unabated, but it is largely theoretical because of
the difficulty of defining standards and metrics that allow useful
116
comparisons. Anecdotal evidence does suggest that the tie-breaker
model can effect at least a marginal reduction in partisanship in the
redistricting process.117 Given the continued litigation of plans in
states with such commissions, however, they are clearly not a
118
panacea. In the redistricting cycle following the 2000 census, 51
percent of legislature-drawn plans and 50 percent of commission119
drawn plans were litigated. Although a single redistricting cycle is
insufficient to draw statistically valid conclusions about the rate of
challenges, it is unlikely that adoption of the independent redistricting
commission model significantly reduces litigation of redistricting
plans. This is hardly surprising, though; given the stakes of
redistricting fights, the inability to generate an objectively fair

115. Texas, for instance, spent more than five million dollars funding its three special
legislative sessions during the 2003 re-redistricting process. John Ratliff, Texas Republicans
Crossed the Line This Time, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2003, at B1.
116. See generally Issacharoff, supra note 29 (arguing that indicia of district competitiveness
such as reelection rates and margins of victory could serve as metrics for measuring the success
of politically insulated commissions); Persily, supra note 95 (criticizing Professor Issacharoff’s
argument in favor of independent commissions in part by questioning the usefulness of the
suggested metrics).
117. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., The Practice of Redistricting, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 1029, 1030–
31 (2001) (reflecting on personal experiences in Colorado’s redistricting processes and offering
suggestions to further reduce partisan effects on the independent commission).
118. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Redistricting Cases: The 2000s,
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum2000/redsum2000.htm
(last
visited Dec. 29, 2005) [hereinafter NCSL, 2000s Redistricting Litigation] (summarizing litigation
challenging redistricting plans in each of the states during the 2000 cycle); NCSL, 1990s
Redistricting Litigation, supra note 2 (same for the 1990 cycle).
119. Eleven of eighteen state legislative redistricting plans and two of eight congressional
redistricting plans drawn by commissions were challenged in court; in comparison, eighteen of
thirty-two state legislative redistricting plans and twenty of forty-two congressional redistricting
plans drawn by state legislatures were challenged. NCSL, 2000s Redistricting Litigation, supra
note 118. These summaries represent only cases self-reported to NCSL, which may affect the
data significantly. In addition, the data reported here presume that when redistricting plans
went unchallenged in states with backup commissions the legislatures had drawn the plans; if
incorrect, this assumption would overstate the rate at which commission plans were litigated.
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districting map, and the ready availability of partisan litigants, it is
unlikely that anything other than a restriction on courts’ subject
matter jurisdiction will successfully reduce the caseload generated by
redistricting.
As continued litigation is likely regardless of the adoption of
redistricting commissions, perhaps a better metric for measuring their
success would be the rate at which their redistricting plans are upheld.
As several commentators have noted, the pattern of Supreme Court
jurisprudence suggests that plans drawn by a disinterested party,
whether a commission or a judge, may be an informal safe harbor
120
against claims of racial gerrymandering. Moreover, during the 1980
and 1990 redistricting cycles, plans adopted by commissions fared
121
remarkably well compared with legislature-drawn plans. Thus,
although litigation following redistricting may be unavoidable, it
might be possible to avoid the costs of court-ordered re-redistricting
(and, likely, litigating the second plan) by adopting the commission
model.
D. Obstacles to Adoption of Independent Redistricting Commissions
However normatively desirable independent redistricting
commissions may be, there remain significant institutional pressures
against their adoption in states that still delegate redistricting to their
legislatures. To move from redistricting-by-legislature to redistrictingby-commission, power must be wrested from the grasp of legislators
who are loath to relinquish it. Despite relatively frequent calls for
such commissions, actual conversions are rare: in the last seven years,
only two states have switched to the commission model, and both
successful conversions required a popular referendum to approve a
state constitutional amendment.122 By contrast, numerous legislative

120. Ely, supra note 110, at 634–35; Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 646–47; Kubin, supra note
82, at 868–72.
121. See Kubin, supra note 82, at 862–68 (surveying “the litigation win-loss record of
commissions in . . . state supreme court and federal district court opinions” adjudicating
challenges to commission-drawn redistricting plans).
122. In 1998, Alaska voters approved a ballot measure that amended the constitutional
provisions implementing an advisory commission model to require a commission with primary
responsibility for drawing state legislative districts. ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS, ALASKA 1998
OFFICIAL ELECTION PAMPHLET, BALLOT MEASURE 3 (1998), available at
http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/1998oep/98bal3.htm. In 2000, Arizona voters
approved Proposition 106, which set up an independent commission with responsibility for
redrawing both legislative and congressional districts. ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2000 BALLOT

032006 03_BATES.DOC

356

4/24/2006 12:28 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:333

efforts have failed. For instance, both the Kansas and North Carolina
legislatures considered bills in 2003 that would have delegated their
123
but both
redistricting processes to independent commissions,
measures failed. As the dean of the University of North Carolina Law
School commented during a prior North Carolina dalliance with
conversion to a commission system, “I feel more secure about my civil
liberties in a state without initiative powers. I am also, however, far
less optimistic about the possibilities for political reform.”124
Recent efforts at such political reforms have moved forward only
haltingly in referendum states: Common Cause, a nonpartisan publicinterest advocacy group, placed an amendment to the Ohio state
constitution on the November 2005 ballot that would have created a
125
bipartisan redistricting commission, and Governor Schwarzenegger
of California supported a ballot proposition that would have
appointed a panel of retired judges to redraw congressional and
legislative districts in an attempt to improve electoral
competitiveness.126 Although neither of these measures was
127
successful, the reform movement may not yet be exhausted. The
Committee for Fair Elections is collecting signatures in Florida in
support of a 2006 ballot initiative to create a nonpartisan redistricting
body,128 a Republican state senator in Nevada has proposed adopting

PROPOSITIONS, PROPOSITION 106 (2000), available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2000/Info/
pubpamphlet/english/prop106.pdf.
123. S. Con. Res. 1607, 80th Leg., 2003 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2003); H.B. 1060, 2003 Gen. Assem.,
Sess. 2003 (N.C. 2003).
124. Nichol, supra note 117, at 1030 n.6.
125. Common Cause, Reform Ohio Now, http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkL
NK1MQIwG&b=880499 (last visited Dec. 29, 2005); see also Initiative Petition, http://www.
commoncause.org/atf/cf/{FB3C17E2-CDD1-4DF6-92BEBD4429893665}/ron_amendments.pdf,
at 1–3 (last visited Dec. 29, 2005) (providing the text of the proposed amendment).
126. John M. Broder, Schwarzenegger Proposes Overhaul of Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
6, 2005, at A16.
127. See Brookings Institution, Redistricting Reform after the Failed Ohio and California
Initiatives 3 (Nov. 15, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/
20051115.pdf) (comments of Thomas Mann) (noting the failure of reform proposals in both
states); id. at 12 (comments of Bruce Cain) (attributing the defeat of the California proposal in
part to its perceived lack of bipartisanship); id. at 19 (comments of Michael McDonald)
(attributing the defeat of the Ohio proposal in part to its requirement of mid-decade
redistricting and concomitant fears of partisan motivation in light of Texas’s experience).
128. Florida’s Committee for Fair Elections, http://www.committeeforfairelections.com (last
visited
Dec.
29,
2005);
see
also
FairVote.
Florida
Redistricting
Watch,
http://www.fairvote.org/?page=1390 (last visited Dec. 29, 2005) (detailing the effect of the
proposed state constitutional amendments).
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129
an independent commission model there, and efforts at reform
remain ongoing in Massachusetts and other states.130
As the experiences of Kansas and North Carolina show, pressure
external to the normal tensions of state governance may be necessary
for change to occur. But, as the cases of Ohio and California
demonstrate, such external pressure may not be sufficient to achieve
significant reform. Although a national consensus on whether
redistricting should be removed from the purview of state legislatures
131
has not yet been achieved, the numerous reform efforts now
underway suggest that an ever-larger segment of the population is
becoming engaged by the issue. Moreover, if the failures of singlestate reform initiatives can be attributed in part to fears of partisan
motivation, as in Ohio and California,132 a nationwide federal solution
may garner greater popular support because the perception of
partisan motivation would be diminished when the beneficiaries of
such a move were obscured, at least relative to a single-state reform
effort. These conditions, combined with the persuasive normative
case for independent redistricting commissions as a buffer against
partisan gerrymandering, compel the investigation of what Congress’s
power may be when such a consensus emerges. Indeed, such an
investigation is particularly timely, given that efforts to impose a
federal solution are already afoot, as evidenced by the introduction in
Congress of the Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act
(FIRA) of 2005.133 The next Part initiates this investigation.

129. Elizabeth White, Nevada Redistricting Proposal Stems from 2001 Fight, LAS VEGAS
SUN, May 9, 2005, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/nevada/
2005/may/09/050910899.html.
130. FairVote, Massachusetts Redistricting Watch, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=1395 (last
visited Dec. 29, 2005).
131. Cf. Hasen, supra note 62, at 641 (“The adoption of redistricting by commission in
initiative states would be the best indication of an emerging social consensus against partisan
redistricting.”).
132. See Brookings Institution, supra note 127, at 12, 19 (suggesting the role played by fear
of underlying partisanship in the defeat of both proposals).
133. H.R. 2642, 109th Cong. (2005). The FIRA would require states to adopt an
independent commission on the tie-breaker model, which would be tasked with producing a
congressional districting map submitted to an up-or-down vote of the legislature, with
responsibility devolving onto state and federal courts in the event of legislative inability to
secure its passage. Substantive criteria such as compactness and contiguity would be imposed on
the districting process, and commission members would be disqualified from running for
congressional office during the ten years following implementation of the map. See Press
Release, Rep. John Tanner, Tanner Redistricting Bill Similar to 1989 Sensenbrenner Proposal
(Nov. 2, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/tanner/press109-049.htm (comparing
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION
From the earliest cases challenging how states have drawn
district lines through the Supreme Court’s October 2003 Term,
federal courts have consistently reiterated that Congress retains
constitutional authority to take positive action to address violations of
representational rights. Justice Frankfurter, cautioning against
judicial entry into the “political thicket” of redistricting,134 argued that
the Constitution has conferred upon Congress exclusive authority to
secure fair representation by the States in the popular House and
left to that House determination whether States have fulfilled their
responsibility. . . . Whether Congress faithfully discharges its duty or
not, the subject has been committed to the exclusive control of
135
Congress.

This claim was an important contention in Justice Scalia’s argument
for the Vieth plurality that the precedent recognizing the justiciability
of partisan gerrymanders should be overruled: “[T]he Framers
provided a remedy for such practices in the Constitution. Article I,
§ 4, while leaving in state legislatures the initial power to draw
districts for federal elections, permitted Congress to ‘make or alter’
those districts if it wished.”136 If Congress, as the Vieth plurality
suggests, has sufficient constitutional authority to impose its own
redistricting map on the states, then surely a procedural requirement,
such as the use of an independent redistricting commission to control
partisan gerrymandering, is not an ultra vires intrusion into states’
prerogatives over redistricting.
The argument for constitutional justification proceeds first by
sketching a proposition for congressional action to provide a standard
against which the constitutional sufficiency of Congress’s legislative
authority may be measured. For purposes of historical comparison,
prior instances of federal legislation regulating congressional
redistricting are then briefly considered; these instances of
congressional control over state redistricting processes suggest a

provisions of the FIRA with the Congressional Districting Reform Act of 1989). In virtually all
respects except its failure to address state legislative redistricting, the FIRA accords with the
proposal for action put forward by this Note. See infra Part III.A.
134. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
135. Id. at 554.
136. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004) (plurality opinion).

032006 03_BATES.DOC

2005]

4/24/2006 12:28 PM

STATE REDISTRICTING

359

number of constitutional bases for further federal action of the type
suggested here. In particular, congressional action may be justified
under the Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4, and under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, this Note briefly considers the
Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4, as a potential basis for
positive congressional action.
A. A Straw-Man Proposal for Action
The basic requirement of the proposed legislation would be that
no state could adopt a redistricting plan, either for congressional or
state legislative districts, unless it were drawn by an independent
commission meeting specified structural criteria and operating
pursuant to certain procedural criteria.
The “best practices” of states using redistricting commissions,
discussed in Part II.A, suggest such structural criteria. Based upon the
states’ experiences with redistricting-by-commission, Congress could
reasonably require that membership of the commission conform to
one or another of the variants on the tie-breaker model, perhaps
allowing some latitude for state-by-state variations so long as the
basic structure were observed. Further restrictions on membership,
such as a prohibition on current or recent members of the state
legislature and a civil disability requirement preventing commission
members from running for legislative or statewide executive offices,
would provide additional assurances that political self-interest is not a
prominent feature of commission decisionmaking. Requiring that the
137
commission staff be similarly independent also seems sensible. This
list of structural criteria is by no means exhaustive.
The set of procedural criteria to be used by the commissions
could also be specified at the federal level, although it might be
appropriate to preserve some degree of state flexibility to recognize
the importance of continued experimentation by states in their
approaches to representative democracy. Moreover, retaining such
flexibility would preserve the character of the suggested reform as a
purely institution-selecting one, rather than making it an outcome-

137. Cf. Persily, supra note 95, at 675 (noting, as part of a broader criticism of the project to
insulate redistricting from partisanship, that the staff of Iowa’s Legislative Services Agency “is
appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the Legislative Council, which the majority party in
the legislature controls”).
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138
oriented restriction on the states’ prerogatives. But if procedural
criteria were required of state redistricting commissions, those
imposed by Arizona on its redistricting commission—such as
contiguity and compactness, respect for the integrity of “communities
of interest,” and competitiveness139—might serve as an intelligent
starting point for a set of guiding principles. Additional criteria worth
considering might include a restriction on the information upon which
redistricting commissions may base their decisions, such as political
affiliations of registered voters, previous election results, addresses of
incumbent legislators,140 or a formalization of the decennial
redistricting cycle, as other scholars have already proposed.141
Congress could choose from a wide range of implementation
mechanisms, some more intrusive upon states’ traditional
prerogatives than others, some more likely constitutional than others.
For instance, rather than directly requiring states to adopt
independent redistricting commissions, Congress could make
disbursal of federal funds in key policy areas contingent on states’
adoption of such commissions. This tried-and-true approach would
142
almost certainly not violate constitutional norms. On the other
hand, Congress could undertake to remove redistricting from the
states’ purview entirely, perhaps by requiring that all redistricting be
done by a federal redistricting commission; whether the courts would

138. Note, however, that this would be a fundamentally political, rather than constitutional,
choice—the validity of congressional requirements of contiguity, compactness and other
common redistricting criteria is well established. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 275–76 (discussing
approvingly prior congressional regulation of such criteria in state redistricting processes).
139. See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14) (listing redistricting goals which the state
redistricting commission is required to accommodate).
140. Restrictions on the use of these data, among others, are imposed by statute on the Iowa
Legislative Services Agency. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.4(5) (West 1999) (prohibiting
consideration of certain data during the redistricting process).
141. See Cox, supra note 107, at 782 (proposing a decennial floor on redistricting).
142. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (requiring that the object
of the funding conditions advance the general welfare, that the conditions be unambiguous and
not unrelated to the purpose of the federal spending program, and that the conditions not
themselves be subject to an independent constitutional bar). Given the reach of the Spending
Clause precedents, it seems difficult to argue that requiring the use of independent redistricting
commissions as a condition for disbursal of federal funds would be unconstitutional, so long as
the requirement were rationally related to the purpose of the funds, as would clearly be the case
with federal election funding. Simply because such a method would be constitutional, however,
does not guarantee that it would be effective; the federal leverage on state legislatures in this
instance might simply be too small to overcome legislators’ inertia and self-interest. Thus, this
Note looks to the more radical proposition of Congress directly requiring state action and
attempts to justify its authority to do so. See infra Part III.B–D.
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143
invalidate such a move is a much closer question. The middle path
proposed here, however—an institution-selecting requirement that
nonetheless leaves the task of redistricting in state hands—is intended
to approximate the proper outer bound of constitutional authority for
direct action and to illustrate certain constitutional problems that
such action might engender.144

B. The Elections Clause as a Basis of Authority
The first plausible basis of constitutional authority is the
145
Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4. Considering the prior
history of congressional regulation of redistricting, this clause could
reasonably support further congressional action regulating the
decennial revision of congressional districts. The scope of the
Elections Clause, however, is limited to federal elections. Moreover,
reliance upon it to justify the proposed legislation could raise
significant Tenth Amendment concerns.
Reliance on the Elections Clause provides clear precedent for
congressional control over redistricting. The Apportionment Act of
146
1842, enacted pursuant to this clause, instituted the first federal
restrictions on the boundaries of congressional districts, providing a
clear demonstration that the Elections Clause can be a source of
congressional authority in this area. Subsequent acts, enacted under
the same authority, enlarged the set of federal requirements imposed
on state redistricting practices.147 Congressional authority under the

143. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that redistricting is primarily a responsibility
and prerogative of the states. E.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 33–35 (1993); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586–87 (1964); see also Cox, supra note 107, at 780–81, 780 n.114.
144. In many respects, this proposal is quite similar to the Fairness and Independence in
Redistricting Act (FIRA) of 2005, H.R. 2642, 109th Cong. (2005). The primary difference is that
the proposal advanced here would extend to state legislative redistricting, while the FIRA is
limited to congressional redistricting. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
145. Article I, Section 4 provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
146. Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (requiring single-member districts and
district contiguity).
147. See, e.g., Apportionment Act of 1901, ch. 93, 31 Stat. 733 (imposing a district
compactness requirement); Apportionment Act of 1872, ch. 11, 17 Stat. 28 (imposing an
equipopulation requirement).
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Elections Clause to enact such redistricting rules for congressional
148
districts has been essentially unquestioned in modern times.
However, the action suggested in this Note would extend ideally
to state legislative redistricting. But, the Elections Clause is limited to
elections of members of the federal legislature; justifying interference
with election procedures for state legislative officials seems well
beyond its scope.
Other potential problems with relying on congressional authority
derived from the Elections Clause could arise with respect to the
balance of federal-state power and the underlying principle of
federalism. Unlike previously enacted outcome-based restrictions,
149
such as contiguity or compactness of districts, or even proposed
process-based restrictions, such as a lower bound on the frequency of
150
redistricting, a requirement that state legislatures delegate their
authority over redistricting to independent commissions is an
institution-selecting regulation.151 As a general matter, institutionselecting devices such as that proposed here seem least compatible
with the Elections Clause’s initial textual commitment of
responsibility for redistricting to state legislatures, although this
commitment may be more elastic than an initial reading would
indicate.152
A more pressing federalism concern is that the proposed action,
if justified under the Elections Clause, could run afoul of the Tenth
Amendment and the Supreme Court’s admonishment in New York v.
United States that “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the
153
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” If, as
New York suggests, Congress is limited to noncoercive methods of
“urg[ing] a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with

148. Cox, supra note 107, at 794 & n.164. Earlier views of congressional authority under the
Elections Clause were more circumscribed. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 555 (1946)
(collecting nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century commentary questioning the extent of
congressional powers under the clause).
149. See Apportionment Act of 1901, ch. 93, 31 Stat. 733 (compactness); Apportionment Act
of 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (contiguity).
150. See Cox, supra note 107, at 782 (proposing a lower bound on redistricting frequency).
151. See id. at 756 (categorizing redistricting regulations as outcome-based, process-based,
and institution-selecting).
152. See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 266–72 (2003) (reaffirming the propriety of judicially
drawn district boundaries in the absence of legislative action).
153. 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
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154
federal interests,” then regulation under the Elections Clause that
required state implementing legislation would risk being considered
legislative commandeering. A requirement that states set up and fund
independent redistricting commissions may well violate the Supreme
Court’s injunction that “state legislatures are not subject to federal
direction.”155
This question, “[w]hether the anticommandeering principle of
New York and Printz is as robust in the Article I, § 4, context . . . as it
is in the Article I, § 8, context,”156 is addressed squarely in Branch v.
Smith. In that case, which briefly considered the constitutionality of
coercing states into performing their constitutionally mandated task
of redistricting under 2 U.S.C. § 2c, the Court held that such federal
prescriptions are permissible regulations under the Elections Clause:

To be sure, § 2c “envisions legislative action,” but in the context of
Article I, § 4, cl. 1, such “Regulations” are expressly allowed. . . .
Congress was not placing a statutory obligation on the state
legislatures as it was in New York v. United States; rather it was
regulating . . . the manner in which a State is to fulfill its pre-existing
157
constitutional obligations . . . .

The congressional action proposed here would require many, if not
most, states to pass legislation delegating authority and appropriating
funds to redistricting commissions, potentially distinguishing the
proposed action from the regulation in Branch in that the state
legislation envisioned by 2 U.S.C. § 2c involves only the adoption of
redistricting plans. Although it seems unlikely that the proposed
legislation (at least as to congressional redistricting) would be struck
down on anticommandeering grounds, the action suggested here
could certainly be seen as violating the values of federalism and
comity that underlie recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. Thus,
the initial assumption of essentially unlimited congressional authority
to regulate congressional redistricting procedures under the Elections
Clause may not be wholly warranted. At the same time, Branch
provides some support for the idea that federal legislation of the type

154. Id. at 166; see id. at 168 (“By either of these methods, as by any other permissible
method of encouraging a State to conform to federal policy choices, the residents of the State
retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will comply.” (emphasis added)).
155. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 912 (1997).
156. Branch, 538 U.S. at 302 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. Id. at 280 (citations omitted).
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this Note advocates would be a permissible regulation under the
Elections Clause, at least as to congressional districts.
C. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a Basis of Authority
The second plausible constitutional basis for the proposed
congressional action is Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
158
which enforces the guarantee of equal protection. As the Voting
159
Rights Act
demonstrates, legislation protecting the elective
franchise against violations of equal protection can reach both
160
congressional and state legislative redistricting practices. Moreover,
the Supreme Court’s recognition in Bandemer and Vieth of the equal
protection violation implied by partisan gerrymanders provides a
constitutional basis for using Congress’s Section 5 powers to enact
legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, even if no
judicially manageable standards are discernible to adjudicate the
claims of individual plaintiffs.
But although such recognition should give wide latitude to
remedial legislation to correct existing gerrymanders, the suggested
reforms are effectively a prophylactic rule not unlike the statutory
requirement of preclearance of redistricting plans under Section 5 of
161
the Voting Rights Act. Congressional authority to enact such
prophylactic legislation has been severely limited by the line of
162
decisions stemming from City of Boerne v. Flores, under which
congressional action must be congruent and proportional to the
constitutional harm in order to prevent Congress from legislatively
expanding the substantive meaning of the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses.163 The degree of judicial deference accorded to
congressional judgment about the constitutional violation at issue
depends upon the level of scrutiny applied to alleged violations of the
right asserted; when the right being protected is one viewed as

158. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power “to enforce, by
appropriate legislation,” the substantive guarantees of equal protection and due process of law
found in Section 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
159. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973–1973p (2000)).
160. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 (1966) (upholding Section 4(e) of the
Voting Rights Act as a proper exercise of congressional power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
162. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
163. Id. at 519–20.
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“fundamental,” Congress need not build a record of pervasive
unconstitutional state government action violating the right
164
asserted.
Although the racial classifications targeted by the Voting Rights
Act served to justify its prophylactic rules,165 the Supreme Court’s
166
has varied
treatment of the “constitutional ‘right’ to vote”
167
significantly over time. This raises the important question whether
infringement of the right is sufficient to justify prophylactic legislation
under Section 5 in the absence of considerable documentation of
pervasive unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. Such a
requirement might place a Congress that attempted to legislate
against partisan gerrymandering into an even more difficult position
than a private plaintiff challenging a gerrymander who sought to
satisfy the Davis v. Bandemer standard by documenting the consistent
degradation of voters’ influence over the political process as a
whole.168 This would be an odd result, given Bandemer’s prior
164. Compare Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 645 (1999) (“The legislative record . . . suggests that the Patent Remedy Act [abrogating
state sovereign immunity against patent infringement claims] does not respond to a history of
‘widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights’ of the sort Congress has faced in
enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation.” (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
526 (1997))), with Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (“Because the
standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult
to meet than our rational-basis test . . . it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state
constitutional violations.”).
165. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (“Congress was similarly successful in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, where we upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Because racial classifications are
presumptively invalid, most of the States’ acts of race discrimination violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
166. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633 (1993).
167. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (“It has been repeatedly recognized that
all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right to vote . . . .”). According to the
recent interpretation of one noted constitutional scholar, “[a]s the Constitution is now
understood, states are not required to provide elections for state offices. But when elections are
held, the right to vote qualifies as fundamental . . . .” Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2096 (2005) (footnote omitted); cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104
(2000) (noting that although there is no constitutional right to vote for electors in a presidential
election, once states hold such elections the right to vote is fundamental).
168. See 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (noting that the Court cannot presume degradation of
political influence from election results without additional proofs presented by the plaintiff); cf.
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368, 377, 389–90 & app. A (2001)
(determining that “[t]he legislative record of the [Americans with Disabilities Act] . . . simply
fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in
employment against the disabled,” despite the dissent’s thirty-nine page appendix documenting
the “vast legislative record [of] ‘massive, society-wide discrimination’ against persons with
disabilities”); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 640, 645 (finding that,
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recognition of the constitutional nature of gerrymandering violations
and the strident calls for the whole matter to be declared a
nonjusticiable political question, but it certainly is not out of the
question.
However, if future partisan gerrymandering cases are to be
169
nonjusticiable, it seems that such a judicial commitment of the issue
to the political branches implies an expectation of deference to action
by the political branches to correct the problems the judiciary was
unable or unwilling to solve. Thus, prophylactic legislation to correct
the equal protection violation recognized in Bandemer should be
evaluated under the deferential standard of Hibbs, given that the
courts have already identified the targeted wrong, so long as the
congressional action is rationally related to the problem of partisan
gerrymandering.
D. The Guarantee Clause as a Basis of Authority
The final potential constitutional basis for congressional action is
the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4,170 though it has long
been dismissed for not being “a repository of judicially manageable
171
standards” to evaluate claimed violations of representational rights.
The inability of judges to discern manageable standards from a
constitutional provision cannot imply that the legislative and
executive branches are similarly powerless with respect to it. To hold
that the Guarantee Clause has no potential for positive congressional
action simply because cases arising under it have been deemed
nonjusticiable would effectively read the clause out of the
Constitution entirely. To return to a prior theme, the commitment of
a question to the political branches is an invitation to action by the
political branches and necessarily carries an implication of the power

because “Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern
of constitutional violations,” “[t]he legislative record thus suggests that the Patent Remedy Act
does not respond to a history of ‘widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights’
of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation” (quoting City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)).
169. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004) (plurality opinion) (inviting lower
courts to interpret Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as a “reluctant fifth vote against
justiciability”); see also supra notes 63–72 and accompanying text.
170. Article IV, Section 4 provides, in relevant part, that the “United States shall guarantee
to every state . . . a Republican Form of Government.” U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4.
171. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962); see id. at 224 (holding that challenges to state
or federal action based on the Guarantee Clause do not present a justiciable question).
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to undertake such action. Any other result changes the political
question doctrine from a prudential rule of judicial administration
into a unilaterally exercised tool to render disfavored portions of the
Constitution nugatory.
Intriguing revisionist scholarship by Professor (now Judge)
172
Michael McConnell suggests that the reliance of Baker v. Carr and
Reynolds v. Sims on the Equal Protection Clause, rather than on the
Guarantee Clause, for judicially manageable standards to address
malapportionment has led ineluctably to the racial and partisan
gerrymandering problems common in redistricting maps and legal
battles of the present day.173 If the question is whether a state system
of government prevents effective majority rule, rather than whether
an individual is unable to exercise equally the right to vote, then
partisan gerrymandering “designed to entrench a particular political
faction against effective political challenge” violates easily derivable
constitutional norms.174 Although such a doctrinal shift may not
immediately yield standards for judicial restraint of partisan
175
gerrymanders, the republicanism norm embodied in the Guarantee
Clause provides a strong argument for Congress’s retention of
authority to undertake legislative action against partisan
gerrymanders.
IV. POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO CONGRESSIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
OF INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS
Even if the action proposed here is constitutionally permissible,
there remain significant obstacles to effective implementation.
Foremost among these is the political difficulty in assembling a
congressional majority and a presidential signature to actually enact
the legislation. A less obvious, though no less destructive, issue is the
potential for partisan capture of the implementation process.

172. Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2000).
173. Id. at 106–07.
174. Id. at 116.
175. As Professor Issacharoff notes, Judge McConnell’s interpretation of the Guarantee
Clause “may better capture the constitutional interest in the context of the extreme
malapportionment evident in Baker or Reynolds,” but “[a]t some level, the same problems that
challenge the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence will reassert themselves in trying to give
content to the equally open-textured [Guarantee] Clause.” Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 614.
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The largest hurdle to implementation of the proposed action is
political—the unlikelihood of its adoption by Congress. So far as
congressional redistricting goes, such a measure would require
incumbent members of Congress to vote against their own interests.
As discussed in Part II.D, there is a reason that effective, independent
commissions are generally adopted through popular referenda.
Moreover, given partisan actors’ belief that gerrymandering delivers
favorable electoral results, as evidenced by their continued
willingness to carve states into bizarre districts, the political calculus
suggests that party as well as individual interests would strongly
oppose a proposal uniformly requiring independent redistricting
commissions. As one scholar argues, a social consensus or nearconsensus in favor of such commissions may be a necessary
precondition to either legislative or judicial willingness to force
reluctant states into adopting the redistricting-by-commission
model.176 In the congressional context, such consensus may be even
more necessary, in that representatives unresponsive to voter
preferences are insulated from electoral reproach by the lack of
competition for their seats—the very state of affairs that a
congressional requirement of independent redistricting commissions
seeks to overturn.
Moreover, if the insights of social choice theory hold true as
applied to politics,177 then congressional power to force the states to
adopt redistricting commissions may simply lead to even greater
partisanship under the banner of independence. The doctrinal
underpinnings of equal protection and the historical experience of
remedying race-based voter discrimination provide a roadmap for
one possible avenue for such capture: partisan-motivated selective
application of independent commissions.
Imagine that the House Republican leadership, seeking to
further increase the Republican margin in the 2012 elections and
intrigued by the failed 2005 ballot measure proposed by Governor

176. See Hasen, supra note 62, at 641–42 (suggesting that judicial intervention in partisan
gerrymandering cases, such as prophylactically requiring employment of an independent
commission model, must await a more defined social consensus).
177. In essence, social choice theory holds that whoever controls the means controls the
ends. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 75–80 (2d ed. 1963). In
the political context, one scholar notes that “all election mechanisms are vulnerable to
manipulation . . . by those who structure the rules concerning the presentation of questions to
voters to create pathways that favor one or another outcome.” Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 595.
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178
Schwarzenegger, introduces legislation requiring California, and
only California, to implement an independent redistricting
commission.179 The idea would be that by breaking Democratic
congressional incumbents’ hold on their seats, Republicans would
stand greatly improved chances of picking up seats within the
remarkably static California delegation.180 Both doctrine and
precedent under the Equal Protection Clause would support such a
move. In fact, precisely this kind of targeting by the Voting Rights
Act was upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach:181 “The Act
intentionally confines these remedies to a small number of States and
political subdivisions which in most instances were familiar to
Congress by name. . . . In acceptable legislative fashion, Congress
chose to limit its attention to the geographic areas where immediate
action seemed necessary.”182 If the coverage criteria are rationally
related to the evil that Congress seeks to remedy, they are
183
permissible; it does not matter that similarly situated states might be
184
excluded.
The primary limitation on this model of partisan-motivated
selective application is the overall limitation on congressional power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment imposed by City of
Boerne v. Flores. If Boerne were read to require state-specific findings
and documentation of pervasive unconstitutional action by each state

178. See Broder, supra note 126, at A16.
179. Plainly, if the electoral positions were reversed, the political incentives would be the
same, or even stronger, for Democrats to behave in an identical manner toward a
gerrymandered, Republican-tilting state such as Texas.
180. In the 2004 elections, no incumbents in California’s congressional delegation lost. See
Charlie Cook, Why Are Most House Members Unbeatable?, 37 NAT’L J. 59, 59 (2005), available
at http://www.cookpolitical.com/column/2004/010805.php (noting that, outside Texas, only three
incumbents failed in their reelection bids—one each from Georgia, Illinois, and Indiana). Only
two of fifty-three California congressional races were close by historical margins—that is, won
with less than 55% of the vote. House Members Who Won with 55% or Less, COOK POL. REP.,
Dec. 6, 2004, available at http://www.cookpolitical.com/races/report_pdfs/2004_house_55_
dec6.pdf.
181. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
182. Id. at 328.
183. See id. at 330 (“[T]he coverage formula is rational in both practice and theory. It was
therefore permissible to impose the new remedies . . . .”).
184. See id. at 330–31 (“It is irrelevant that the coverage formula excludes certain
localities . . . for which there is evidence of voting discrimination by other means. . . . Legislation
need not deal with all phases of a problem in the same way, so long as the distinctions drawn
have some basis in practical experience.”).
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185

individually, Congress’s ability to manipulate the implementation of
the proposed reform by singling out certain states would be
significantly constrained, assuming the present existence of a partisan
gerrymander in any given redistricting cycle was in itself insufficient
evidence of “a history and pattern of unconstitutional [state
action].”186 If the lowered standards for Section 5 enforcement
187
associated with fundamental rights are applicable in this context,
however, or if congressional finding of the existence of a partisan
gerrymander sufficed to meet the documentary requirements, Boerne
would not present an independent barrier to selective application of
the reform, even though enacted with partisan, rather than reformist,
intent. Moreover, if the legislation were constitutionally justified
under one of the other bases for action discussed above, Boerne itself
would simply be inapplicable.
CONCLUSION
Partisan gerrymandering inflicts significant political and
constitutional harms on the voting public by decreasing
representative responsiveness through diminished electoral
competitiveness and by diluting the franchise for some voters because
of their political affiliation. In some states, generally those with
popular referendum mechanisms, these harms have been lessened or
avoided through the adoption of independent redistricting
commissions. These experiments with redistricting processes have
provided several promising models for reducing partisan bias in
redistricting outcomes without entirely sacrificing the benefits of a
politically adversarial process. The spread of independent
redistricting commissions to nonreferendum states is limited,
however, by the very self-interested parties that the commissions seek
to control: the state legislative majorities currently in control of the
redistricting process. Moreover, the courts have largely refused to
police effectively the actions of state legislatures in producing
partisan gerrymanders, having failed, at least for the moment, to
conceptualize the harms these district maps perpetrate against the

185. Justice Scalia has advocated this position in his dissents to decisions upholding
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity under Section 5. Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U.S. 509, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,
741–43 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
187. See supra Part III.C.
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constitutional rights of individual voters in a way that provides a
manageable standard for evaluating plaintiffs’ claims. In recognizing
that such constitutional harms do exist, however, even if the courts
cannot precisely describe them, the Supreme Court has opened the
door for congressional action on a remedial or prophylactic basis. As
this Note argues, Congress would be normatively and constitutionally
justified in walking through that door by requiring states to adopt
independent commissions as the primary mechanism for redistricting
following the decennial census. Although no national political
consensus now exists that would support passage of such legislation,
congressional action of this nature may yet address the harms posed
by partisan gerrymandering.

